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Abstract
We examine asymmetric information about migrant earnings and its implications
for remittance behavior using a sample of Indian households with husbands working
overseas in Qatar. On average, wives underreport their husbands' income and
underreporting is more prevalent in households with higher earning migrants. The
discrepancy in earning reports is strongly correlated with variation in remittances:
greater underreporting by wives is associated with lower remittances. We develop
an exchange model of remittances with asymmetric information and costly state
verication. The optimal remittance contract prescribes a threshold for remittances
that invites verication only if unmet. The model's predictions closely match our
empirical ndings. JEL: D13, D82, F22, F24.
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Introduction
The growth of international migration has been accompanied by a rising number of
transnational or split households in developing nations with one or more members working
abroad. Geographical separation can result in asymmetric information about behavior
and economic conditions of separated household members, which may have signicant
implications for intra-household transfers.
In particular, if foreign earnings are private information, the migrant can strategi-
cally take advantage of the informational asymmetry and remit a lower amount than if
his earnings were perfectly observable. Indeed, McKenzie et al. (2013) provide sugges-
tive evidence that Tongan male migrants to New Zealand underreport earnings to avoid
pressure to remit from family members. In an experimental study, Ambler (2015) nds
that Salvadoran migrants in the US shared less of a lottery prize with their households
in El Salvador if their families were unaware of it.1 This incipient evidence indicates that
informational asymmetries about migrants' economic conditions can be a signicant fac-
tor of remittance behavior, which, even though recognized in the literature (see Rapoport
and Docquier (2006, p. 1143)), has hardly been studied.2
This paper deals with informational asymmetry about migrant earnings and exam-
ines, theoretically and empirically, the impact of this asymmetry on remittance ows.
1The problem of asymmetric information is also relevant for intact households making intra-household
transfers. In a related study of non-migrant households, Ashraf (2009) shows that Filipino men whose
wives manage the nancial aairs of the household will hide money from their spouses when that decision
is kept private. In comparison to intact households, the distinguishing feature of transnational households
is a larger scale of intra-household transfers (i.e. remittances) and the availability of data on such
transfers.
2There is a recent body of literature that studies the remittance behavior of migrants that are in-
formationally disadvantaged about remittance uses by household members remaining behind. Ashraf et
al. (2015) show that a randomized intervention which helped El Salvadoran migrants in the United
States control and monitor savings in recipient households led to higher savings levels back home. De
Laat (2014) nds that internal migrants in Kenya not only invest considerable resources in information
acquisition before remitting to their spouses but even change their marital search behavior to mitigate
the consequences of pending imperfect information. Also see Chen (2006, 2013) for evidence on the
eects of imperfect monitoring on household production.
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Generally, the main obstacle for conducting an empirical analysis is the absence of data
on informational asymmetries within split households, which surveys of migrant or house-
hold alone cannot possibly provide. We oer a new solution to this problem. We assess
informational asymmetries about income earned abroad by collecting migrants' reports
about their earnings and contrasting these reports with accounts of their earnings col-
lected from the remittance recipients. To our knowledge, this is one of the rst few studies
using a matched household dataset that collects cross-reports on variables of interest.3
We are able to oer new evidence of substantial asymmetry in information within
split households. In our representative sample of South Indian migrant households, where
husbands are migrant workers in Qatar and wives remain behind in Kerala, India, wives
report on average only about 79 percent of their husbands' earnings, which we show is
unrelated to any reporting bias. We nd that underreporting is not uniform across house-
holds { it is more prevalent in households with higher earning migrants. In particular,
we observe that the reported earnings ratio { the ratio of the wife's report of her hus-
band's earnings to that of her husband's { decreases in migrant earnings. Importantly,
we nd that asymmetric information about the migrant's income is strongly correlated
with variation in remittances: all else equal, the lower the reported earnings ratio, the
smaller the annual remittance sent home.
By design, existing remittance models, mainly based on the symmetric information
assumption, are not able to account for any dierences in cross-reports and consequently,
cannot explain the observed relationship between the reported earnings ratio and remit-
tances.4 To account for our empirical ndings, we develop a model around the exchange
motive for remittances (Cox (1987); Cox et al. (1998)) with asymmetry in informa-
tion about the migrant's earnings. The purchase of household services by \remittances"
are generally indicative of temporary migration, signaling the migrant's intent to return,
which is highly applicable with the sample of contract-based migrants studied in this
paper. We take the view that remittance behavior is governed by implicit familial con-
3De Weerdt et al. (2014) use a matched sample of domestic migrants and extended family in Tanzania
to examine remittance motives under asymmetric information.
4In Section V, we compare the predictions of alternative remittance models with our empirical ndings.
See Stark (1995) and Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for reviews of remittance models.
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tracts,5 enforced on migrants under the threat of social or familial sanctions as discussed
later. As a concrete situation, we consider a relationship between the recipient and the
migrant, where the former provides household services to the benet of the latter or
nances migration costs in exchange for remittances. In this interaction, the recipient
oers the migrant a \remittance contract" that species how much of his income, net
of subsistence cost, is to be remitted. However, the recipient can observe the migrant's
income, which can be subject to private income or consumption shocks, only if she veries
it with a costly audit, e.g., by exerting eort to collect information from her social or
migrant network.
The situation described above falls in the domain of the literature on costly state
verication started with Townsend (1979) (also see Gale and Hellwig (1985)). The
recipient's problem of oering a remittance contract parallels the problem of an investor
oering a loan contract to an entrepreneur whose investment returns are unobservable to
the investor. The form of the optimal remittance contract resembles that of the optimal
loan contract, i.e., a xed-repayment contract. In particular, the recipient species a
threshold for remittances, which is a minimum level of remittance that the migrant has
to provide in order to avoid any scrutiny of his earnings and, possibly, sanctions. If the
migrant cannot remit this minimum on account of a negative income or consumption
shock, then, aside from remitting his entire net income, he had better be prepared to
justify the smaller amount transferred.
In line with our empirical ndings, the model predicts reporting behavior where the
migrant is truthful about his income only at its lower levels that prohibits the migrant
from fullling the remittance expectations held at home. When income is high, the
migrant does not need to reveal his income truthfully as long as his remittance meets the
prescribed threshold, and he would rather not report or underreport his income out of
fear of disadvantageous contractual revisions in the future. The threshold for remittance
is reective of the degree of informational asymmetry and so is the reported earnings
ratio because it directly depends on the threshold. As our model predicts that expected
5For more on this view, see Lucas and Stark (1985); Hoddinott (1994); Poirine (1997); Ilahi and
Jafarey (1999); de la Briere et al. (2002).
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remittance increases in the threshold, we can also predict that remittance rises, all else
equal, in the reported earnings ratio, which we observe in data. The predicted remittance
behavior is conrmed by a piecewise remittance regression that has a much steeper slope
at lower levels of income. We also check the robustness of the model by testing its
comparative statics predictions.
The following section briey describes migration background relevant to our study.
Section II presents our remittance model with asymmetric information and its theoret-
ical predictions. Section III discusses the dataset, Sections IV and V provide empirical
analysis of the observed reporting and remittance behavior, respectively. The last section
concludes the study.
I Migration Overview
According to Qatar's 2010 census, approximately 90 percent of its 1.7 million population
of age 15 or older were foreign born, rendering it the nation with the highest share
of immigrants in the world (see the World Bank's Migration and Remittances Factbook
2011). The majority of immigrants to Qatar originate from developing countries, with
a signicant proportion from South and East Asia (Kapiszewski (2006)). Migration
to Qatar and to the other Gulf countries is typically temporary, with work contracts
determining the duration of stay (Shah (2008). These contracts are normally for two
years, though renewable at the discretion of the employer. Only workers earning income
above a minimum level are allowed to bring their dependents with them { in Qatar, the
gure was QR 8,000 a month in 2010, the equivalent of US$ 26,300 annually (henceforth,
all monetary measures are converted to US dollars).
Migration from India's southern state of Kerala, where our surveyed migrants come
from, accounts for more than half of the total Indian migration to the Gulf in the 1990s.
Results from the population-representative Kerala Migration Survey 2011 indicated that
17.1 percent of households in Kerala received remittances which were estimated to make
up 31 percent of the state's net GDP (Zachariah and Rajan (2012)).
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Migration is typically a familial decision made with the expectation of improving the
family's economic conditions from the migrant's remittances. Especially for temporary
migrants, satisfying the remittance expectations of the family back home is of paramount
importance and is often regarded as the price to pay for the option to return home in
case of illness, temporary or permanent loss of income or to inherit property (Banerjee
(1981); Dustmann and Mestres (2010)). Moreover, the threat of social sanctions or ex-
clusion, including stigmatization from the family is a strong motivating factor for meeting
expectations, which the anthropological literature has long emphasized (Philpott (1968);
Goldring (2004); Peter (2010)). Plateau (2014) points to a large body of ethnographic
work that highlights the importance of shaming, disapproval, ostracism and other means
to pressure giving among (extended) family members in the sub-Saharan Africa. For the
studied case of male migrants from Kerala to the Arabian Gulf, Osella and Osella (2000)
describe the feared risks of migrants losing face and reputation if they do not meet the
social obligations of spending generously on close and direct kin.
II Analytical Framework
In this section, we present an exchange model of remittances with asymmetric information
about migrant earnings based on the classical model with costly state verication of
Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985). The choice of the model is also dictated
by its ability to account explicitly for migrants' reporting behavior contingent on data
made available for this study. In the next section, we state and discuss the predictions
produced by the model that are empirically investigated subsequently.
Consider a transnational household where there is a migrant pursuing a job opportu-
nity abroad and a remittance recipient residing in the origin country. The job opportunity
is temporary with a promised pay of ~y net of subsistence costs. However, it is known
that the actual income received by the migrant is subject to random shock  that can
be positive or negative, e.g, ranging from employers' reneging on promises, experiencing
unexpected expenses or deductions to nding better-paid jobs, working extra time, or a
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pay increase. Denote the migrant's disposable income by y, dened by y = ~y +  , and
its distribution by F (y) that has support [y; y], where 0 < y < y. We refer to disposable
income just as income or earnings until further notice. It is assumed that the distribution
F (y) is commonly known and twice dierentiable with the density function f(y) > 0. The
realization of income, i.e., of the random shock  , is private information to the migrant,
but the recipient can discover it after incurring a verication cost of c > 0.6
The migrant can accept the job abroad only if he secures the support of the recipient:
she, together with the extended family, would need to nance the cost of migration, take
over the migrant's duties or manage his assets in his absence. In return for support, the
recipient requires the migrant to send part of his income as remittance r, 0  r  y.
Formally, the recipient oers a take-it-or-leave-it remittance contract, which we model as a
triple (r(by); S; p(y; by)). Under the contract, the migrant sends an income report by 2 [y; y],
which determines the remittance r(by). If the report by is in the set S  [y; y], it invokes
verication and punishment p(y; by), where p(y; by) = 0 if y = by and p(y; by) = P > 0 if
y 6= by, i.e., if the migrant is found lying.7
The penalty P can take the form of social and familial sanctions against the migrant,
loss of reputation or of social prestige with the recipient's family that could reduce the
insurance against job loss abroad or the prospect of securing the family's inheritance.8
Additionally, let the penalty be suciently large, in particular, P > y  y, so that under
no circumstance the migrant nds it benecial to send a false report that falls in the
verication region.
For actual and reported income levels, y and by, the utility for the recipient is given
6Verications could take the form of inquiring with others in the social network (friends or relatives
working in the same country) about the migrant's situation or making trips to visit the migrant. De
Laat (2014) nds that internal male migrants in Kenya spent considerable resources monitoring their
rural wives and one could imagine similar eort going the other way.
7In our context, as also modeled by Townsend (1979), the problem can be equivalently reformulated
where it is the migrant who oers a remittance contract to the recipient. A contract species how much
of realized income will be remitted and when costly evidence about realized income has to be presented
to the recipient. With this formulation, the migrant's optimal contract shares the same properties of the
recipient's optimal contract discussed below.
8Given the recurrent nature of the migrant-recipient relationship, punishment is a credible contractual
enforcement device. Thus, the commitment problem to undertake verication arising from the cost of c
involved is absent here.
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by
UR(y; by) = vR(r(by) + yR)  cIS(by) (1)
and for the migrant by
UM(y; by) = vM(y   r(by))  IS(by)p(y; by) + (r(by); y): (2)
Above, vR(:) and vM(:) are the recipient's and the migrant's utility functions of consump-
tion, respectively, which until further notice are assumed to be linear, yR is the recipient's
own income, IS(by) is the indicator function dened by IS(by) = 1 if by 2 S and IS(by) = 0
otherwise.9 The function (r(by); y) denotes the additive utility the migrant receives from
the recipient's consumption of his remittances. Specically, this function is meant to
capture other motives for remittance that the migrant may have, which we control for
in our empirical analysis. For analytical convenience, we assume that the recipient does
not perfectly observe the size of this additional utility to the migrant and, thus, assumes
  0 (this assumption has no qualitative impact on the results unless  dominates utility
from private consumption, also see footnote 9).
The recipient oers the contract that maximizes her expected utility in (1) subject
to the condition that the migrant obtains the expected utility of at least U0M  0. We
can reduce the choice set of contracts in the optimization problem as the recipient cannot
possibly benet from contracts that miss (i) r(y) = r for y =2 S, where r is a constant, and
(ii) r(y) < r for y 2 S. If remittances for unveried income reports were not constant,
then the migrant with income y =2 S would always make the report by =2 S that results
in the smallest remittance. If for some income level in S the contracted remittance is
larger than r, then the migrant would rather make a (false) report outside the verication
region.
9The assumption of linear utility allows for the succinct characterization of the optimal contract
determined below. Risk aversion has only an eect on the slope (but not its sign) of the optimal
remittance schedule in the verication region, but other contractual properties (of main interest for this
work) remain intact, see Winton (1995).
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Main Results
The next theorem pins down the form of the optimal contract, which is analogous to a
standard (xed-repayment) loan contract.
Theorem 1 (Townsend (1979)) S = [y; r) and r(y) = min(y; r).
In the optimum, the recipient species a threshold remittance r such that she starts
verication only if the migrant remits less than r. In other words, the recipient species
the smallest acceptable remittance level that does not lead to any scrutiny of the migrant's
income. The proof of this theorem can be found, e.g., in Townsend (1979) or Gale and
Hellwig (1985).
By Theorem 1, the optimal remittance contract is fully characterized by the remittance
threshold. The optimal threshold r solves the recipient's optimization problem
max
r2[y;y]
Z r
y
(y   c)dF (y) + r(1  F (r)) (3)
s:t:Z y
r
(y   r)dF (y)  U0M : (4)
Prior to solving the problem and analyzing its properties, we impose
Assumption 1 (i) The inverse hazard rate 1 F (y)
f(y)
is decreasing in y; (ii) 1
f(y)
> c.
The purpose of this assumption is to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of solution
and to ensure the suciency of the rst-order approach.
Let rc = max(r 2 [y; y] : (4) holds) be the largest value of r that satises the side
constraint so that the choice set of r for the recipient is [y; rc]. (Assume that U0M is
not too large to ensure that rc > y holds). The solution to the unconstrained problem,
denoted by ru, is given by the rst-order condition
1  F (ru)
f(ru)
= c: (5)
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Because of the monotonicity of the derivative of the objective function in (3), the solution
to the recipient's problem is given by
r = min(rc; ru): (6)
As it is evident from (5), due to c > 0 we have ru < y, which also implies that r < y,
i.e., S  [y; y]. In words, if verication is a costly exercise, there is a range of income
reports which the recipient does not verify.
The next two propositions deal with comparative statics properties of the optimal
remittance contract. First, we show that the higher the verication cost c, the lower the
remittance threshold the recipient sets. That is, the optimal contract implies that the
costlier the verication, the less frequently the recipient invokes it.
Proposition 1 dr

dc
 0.
Proof. By the Implicit Function Theorem and Assumption 1, we have dr
u
dc
< 0, which
together with dr
c
dc
= 0 proves the proposition.
The next proposition says that if the recipient holds more pessimistic beliefs about
the migrant's income prospects, then she sets a lower remittance threshold r. A more
pessimistic recipient sets a lower threshold to reduce her expected verication costs as a
larger share of income realizations falls in the low end of the income space.
Proposition 2 Let r1 be the optimal remittance threshold in the problem with distribution
F1(y) and r

2 { with distribution F2(y). If F1(y) stochastically dominates F2(y) in hazard-
rate order, then r1  r2.
Proof. To prove the proposition, it is sucient to show that rc1  rc2 and ru1  ru2 .
Then, even if, e.g., r1 = r
c
1 but r

2 = r
u
2 , the two inequalities prove r

1  r2 because
r1 = r
c
1  rc2  ru2 = r2 where the last inequality follows from (6). The inequality ru1  ru2
can be established from (5) and the hypothesized stochastic dominance. To show rc1  rc2,
rst note that the stochastic dominance in hazard rate implies that the conditional means
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satisfy R y
r
ydF1(y)
1  F1(r) 
R y
r
ydF2(y)
1  F2(r) (7)
for any r 2 [y; y] and also implies the rst-order stochastic dominance, i.e., F1(y)  F2(y).
We have rc1  rc2 if the following holds
Z y
rc2
(y   rc2)dF1(y) 
Z y
rc2
(y   rc2)dF2(y) (8)
i.e., with F1(y) the side constraint (4) can be lax at r = r
c
2. Transforming (8) yields the
inequality
(1  F1(rc2))
0@R yrc2 ydF1(y)
1  F1(rc2)
  rc2
1A  (1  F2(rc2))
0@R yrc2 ydF2(y)
1  F2(rc2)
  rc2
1A ; (9)
which by (7) and F1(y)  F2(y) holds.
Predictions
The optimal remittance contract, characterized by Theorem 1, requires the migrant to
reveal his income truthfully only at lower levels of realized income, y < r. However,
at higher levels of income, y  r, the migrant may choose to send any report by  r
as it leads to the same remittance r and invokes no verication or sanctions. However,
in line with the argument of McKenzie et al. (2013), in the case of a positive income
shock the migrant would rather not reveal his higher income or underreport it to avoid
future demands for more remittance that the recipient may make on the grounds of the
migrant's favorable economic conditions.
Dening the reported earnings ratio as the ratio of the recipient's report of the mi-
grant's earnings to the migrant's own report, we predict
Prediction 1 The reported earnings ratio decreases with positive income shocks.
With regard to reporting behavior, we can also make another prediction that is based
on the comparative statics results presented in Propositions 1 and 2. We interpret the
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ingredients of the model in the following way. The verication cost c captures the degree
of information asymmetry between the migrant and the recipient. The cheaper it is to
determine the income earned by the migrant, the less asymmetry there is, and vice versa.
The distribution F captures the recipient's beliefs about the migrant's earnings.
Prediction 2 The reported earnings ratio is lower when (i) there is more asymmetry in
information, (ii) the recipient holds more pessimistic beliefs.
Intuition is straightforward. With a greater degree of asymmetry due to a higher
cost of verication c, the optimal contract prescribes a lower threshold for remittances,
which in turn necessitates less frequent revelation of current income by the migrant. If
the recipient becomes less optimistic about the migrant's earnings, then she should also
reduce the verication region, again, implying less frequent revelation of income by the
migrant.
Next, we turn to the model's predictions concerning remittance behavior. First of all,
we predict that all else equal
Prediction 3 The lower the reported earnings ratio, the lower the remittances, and vice-
versa.
In the model, for a given realization of income the amount remitted depends on remittance
threshold r and, as it follows immediately from Theorem 1, the expected remittance
decreases in the threshold. At the same time, as discussed above, there is a direct
relationship between the threshold and the reported earnings ratio as a lower threshold
invokes truthful revelation of income less frequently. Thus, taking the reported earnings
ratio as a proxy for the remittance threshold we obtain Prediction 3.
Finally, we predict
Prediction 4 The remittance schedule is steeper at lower levels of income.
The optimal remittance contract requires the remittance of the entire (net) income when
income is low but provides no explicit incentives to remit more than the threshold re-
mittance level. Thus, assuming that other motives such as altruism do not dominate the
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utility of private consumption, we should observe remittances increase in income more
steeply when income is low than when it is high.
III Data
To test the model's predictions, we use a matched sample of 108 male migrants in Doha,
Qatar and their wives back home in Kerala, India.10 The (migrant) husband and the wife
were interviewed separately but the interviews were coordinated such that they began
simultaneously to avoid the possibility that the couple may discuss responses with each
other and the arrival of new information between extended lags. At the start of the
interview, each household member was informed that his or her responses would not be
disclosed to the other spouse. The migrants were interviewed face-to-face while their
wives were interviewed over the phone. Cross reports were obtained { the interviews
documented not only the subjects' responses to questions about themselves but of their
spouse as well. For example, not only was the husband asked about his income but also
his wife was separately queried on his income in Qatar. Detailed data were collected
on the migrant's demographics, expenses, income, life and work satisfaction, remittances
sent home in addition to savings and loan decisions. Similar data were collected from the
migrant's spouse about herself and of the household remaining behind in India.
A local survey rm, staed with migrants from Kerala, was hired to recruit and
subsequently interview the couples between August and December 2010. Recruitment
focused on migrants mostly residing in Doha's Industrial Area. Male interviewers visited
migrants at their dormitory-styled residences where they shared a room with 3 to 4 other
co-workers. After obtaining consent to participate in the study, each migrant was asked
to provide contact information and times suitable for a future interview with him and his
wife in India.11
10We dropped 7 observations wherein the wives did not report their husbands' overseas income and
one observation where the spouse did not provide a remittance report.
11The interviewer would randomly select one migrant to be interviewed per room. A total of 18 such
dormitories were visited which varied in size, the largest of which housed migrants working for a local taxi
and bus operator which constituted nearly 50 percent of the sample. The migrants were informed that a
female sta member would interview their spouses. If a migrant refused to provide contact information,
the survey sta would not arrange for an interview. The rm did not document the number of migrants
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Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the key variables reported by the migrants
and their wives. The average annual foreign income earned in Qatar was the equivalent
of US$ 6,407 and the average of US$ 2,900 or 47% of income was remitted home on
an annual basis. The wives tended to underreport their husbands' earnings, averaging
US$ 4,807 per year according to their account or 79 percent of the husbands' reported
income.12 The mean dierence of US$ 1,600 in foreign income reported by the husband
and the wife was statistically signicant at conventional levels. There was a smaller dis-
crepancy in remittance reports, wherein wives underreported remittances by 12% or US$
523 on average.13 Aside from inaccurate recalls, a possible reason why wives underreport
remittances is that they are reporting the amount received net of the fees deducted by
the receiving agent (the survey did not query the couple about such fees at the receiving
end). We show later that the underreporting of remittances is uncorrelated with the
underreporting of income, which alleviates concerns about reporting biases.
We also compared our sample, labeled henceforth as the Qatar Study of Kerala Fam-
ilies (QSKF), with a representative household survey conducted between December 2010
and June 2011 in Kerala by the Center for Development Studies. The Kerala Migration
Survey (KMS) 2011 covered 15,000 households in all 14 districts of the state and collected
data on characteristics of household members who migrated outside the state. The num-
ber of married, male migrants working in the Arabian Gulf countries (Qatar, United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain) amounted to 1,778 individuals in
the KMS 2011 dataset. Only the household (i.e., not the migrant) was interviewed for
the KMS 2011 so their data is comparable to the responses of the wives in our sample.
Appendix Table A.1 provides the comparison of the summary statistics created from the
that declined to provide their spouse's contact information but they informed us that the fraction was
minimal.
12Such a gure could arise if migrants were instead overreporting their income. We also have compa-
rable data from a separate one-sided survey of married male migrants from Kerala (n = 204) collected
in the rst quarter of 2012, almost 15 months after the survey for the current study. The average annual
income reported was US$ 6,660 and mean annual remittance sent was US$ 3,297, which is only about
US$ 200 more than the corresponding numbers reported in the current sample. This does not suggest a
pattern of overreporting nancial information by the migrant.
13We separately test and nd that underreporting of remittance is uncorrelated with the migrant's
age, income, years married and duration in Qatar, suggestive of classical measurement error. We also
nd no statistically signicant discrepancy in cross reports on observable characteristics known to both
parties.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation
Migrant's Report
Age in years 38.56 7.62
Years married 10.84 7.92
Years employed in Qatar 6.48 6.98
Other family members working abroad (indicator) 0.03 -
Annual earnings in Qatar (US$) 6406.9 2364.7
Annual remittances net of fees (US$) 2900.4 1563.2
Annual remittance as a share of earnings 0.47 0.23
Household's medical expenditure as income share 0.08 0.16
Expenditure on temptation goods (indicator) 0.38 0.49
Disagreement over remittance use (indicator) 0.49 -
Wife's Report
Wife is employed in India (indicator) 0.13 -
Wife's years of education 11.68 2.75
Wife's report of husband's earnings (US$) 4807.3 1799.6
Wife's report of remittances (US$) 2377.8 1827.4
Household's monthly income in India (US$) 38.49 90.54
Household's monthly expenses in India (US$) 227.30 118.07
Migrant is the primary decision-maker (indicator) 0.19 -
Wife is unaware of husband's expenses (indicator) 0.36 -
Constructed Variables
Dierence between reports of earnings in Qatar (US$) -1599.6 207.1*
Ratio of wife's to husband's earning reports 0.79 0.26
Dierence between reports of remittances (US$) -522.7 165.1*
Ratio of wife's to husband's remittance reports 0.88 0.60
Dierence between reports of weekly hours worked** -8.31 2.00*
Ratio of wife's to husband's hours-worked reports 0.90 0.28
Number of observations 108
* statistically signicant at 1% level.
** Only 81 cross-reports of weekly hours were recorded.
recipient household's reports from our QSKF survey and KMS sub-sample, which appear
to be similar in terms of the average age, duration abroad, and annual migrant earnings.
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IV Reporting Behavior
We examine the reporting behavior of migrants using the discrepancy in the couple's
account of overseas income. The reported earnings ratio, denoted by !, is given by
! =
yw
yh
; (10)
where yw is the husband's monthly earnings reported by his wife and yh is the monthly
earnings reported by the husband himself. In terms of the model, yw corresponds to the
income by reported by the migrant to the recipient, and yh to his actual income y.
Figure 1: Migrants' Earnings Residuals Against Reported Earnings Ratio
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Our theoretical predictions describe implications for underreporting of income by
the recipient in a number of cases. According to Prediction 1, the migrant with levels
of income above the remittance threshold r is more likely to take advantage of the
recipient's unawareness of his earnings and to underreport or conceal a positive income
shock. The graphical examination of our data nds strong support for this prediction
(econometric tests are presented in the next subsection). Absent panel data, we measure
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income shocks as outcomes that are unobserved by the remittance recipient. Figure 1
plots residuals from the Mincer wage regression of the migrant's earnings and shows
that positive income shocks (i.e. those that are not anticipated by the spouse based on
observable characteristics of the migrant) is associated with greater underreporting by
the wife.14 Similar patterns hold with the reported earnings ratio simply plotted against
the migrant's report of his annualized earnings and when the level dierence in reported
earnings is plotted against the migrant's annual income (see appendix Figures A.1 and
A.2). Greater underreporting of income by wives tends to occur with higher earning
migrants.
A potential reason for underreporting is the wife's inattentiveness. Specically, the
wife who receives an amount that meets the remittance threshold may not inquire into
or be less attentive to her husband's economic conditions. However, if we assume that
the wife makes her report of the husband's earnings based on the remittance received
plus subsistence costs, we should obtain the same prediction of discrepancy in reports at
higher levels of overseas income. In the next subsection, we further explore and are able
to rule out potential reporting biases.
Determinants of Underreporting
Here, we provide the empirical tests of Predictions 1 and 2 by exploring determinants of
the reported earnings ratio. We ask to what extent the reported earnings ratio reects dif-
fering information sets about the migrant's economic conditions, recipient's belief about
the migrant's income and conicting preferences within the split household as opposed
to simply being noise or an inherent tendency for the wife to underreport nancial in-
formation? To examine our conjectures, we estimate an empirical model of the reported
14The residuals were obtained from the regression of log monthly earnings reported by the migrant
on years of education and work experience. The residuals would also reect unobservable characteristics
such as motivation at work or cognitive abilities that could be partly known to the wife. However, shocks
at destination or the intensity of eort are not observed. As a falsication test, we also examine whether
predicted earnings given the same background characteristics observed by the wife are correlated with the
reported earnings ratio. The regression of the latter on the former yields a coecient that is statistically
not dierent from zero (p-value = 0:40).
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earnings ratio as follows:
!k = 0 + 
0Xk + k; (11)
where !k is the reported earnings ratio of household k, the vector Xk is a collection of
co-variates that are expected to inuence the reported earnings ratio, and k is a random
mean-zero error term. The co-variates are discussed in the following paragraphs.
In terms of variables that reect the wife's ability to monitor her husband's economic
conditions abroad, we include an indicator variable for wives who are unaware of their
spouses' expenses in Qatar. If a wife does not know her husband's expenses, it is likely
that she would also be less aware about his earnings. Hence, by part (i) of Prediction 2,
we expect this indicator variable to be negatively associated with the reported earnings
ratio. Also, as wives' main outside source of information about their husbands' economic
conditions is their social network, wives with paid jobs in India are likely to have a wider
and more diverse social network and, thus, to be in a better position to inquire into the
labor market returns of their spouses. Furthermore, working spouses should also be better
at assessing their husbands' overseas economic conditions as would more educated ones
be as well. Therefore, assuming that working and educated wives face a lesser problem of
asymmetric information, wives' employment and education should have a positive impact
on the reported earnings ratio.
Regarding the predicted role of beliefs on reporting behavior, i.e., part (ii) of Predic-
tion 2, we measure the wife's beliefs with the median migrant earnings in the district that
her household belongs to. We compute median earnings using the household reports of
migrant earnings in the Arabian Gulf countries from KMS 2011 to avoid the inuence of
outliers. Our prediction is that the lower the median, the smaller the ratio.15
We also control for a number of other factors that may aect reporting behavior. A
closer coincidence of preferences between the couple is likely to reduce underreporting,
with an opposite eect for diverging views on remittance uses. A migrant who disagrees
15The Arabian Gulf countries share similar compensation structures. There are 14 districts in Kerala.
While a more disaggregated level of reported migrant income would have been preferred to account for
the relevant information ows to each household, we were only able to identify the district where spouses
resided in our matched sample. However we note that there is a strong correspondence between the taluk
or sub-district level (n = 72) and district level (n = 14) median earnings (r = 0:52).
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with his household over remittance uses is less likely to fully disclose his income so as
to mitigate nancial demands from the other end. We follow Ashraf et al. (2015) and
indirectly capture this by asking the migrant whether he is aware of other people having
disagreement over the uses of remittances by the household back home.16 A migrant
who desires to privately spend on temptation goods (tobacco, alcohol, entertainment,
etc.) is also more likely to conceal his true income from his spouse and we expect the
variable indicating the consumption of temptation goods as reported by the migrant to
be negatively correlated with the reported earnings ratio.
Finally, the observed pattern in the reported earnings ratio could be attributed to the
wife's inherent tendency to underreport her husband's economic position. In the data, we
observe that the wife's account of remittances received from the migrant is, on average,
88 percent of the amount he reports sending annually. Using the dierence in reported
level of remittances is therefore a good gauge of the wife's tendency to underreport (or
the husband's tendency to overreport). If we nd a positive and statistically signicant
correlation between the earnings gap and remittance gap, the latter measured as the
ratio of annual remittance reported by the wife to that reported by her husband, then
this would be evidence of a reporting bias. We could not then readily interpret the
earnings ratio as indicative of an information problem.
Empirical Findings
The results in Column 1 of Table 2 begin with just the inclusion of the migrant's (log)
annual earnings. Column 2 presents results from the OLS regression of the reported
earnings ratio on covariates described earlier. Bootstrapped standard errors are corrected
for clustering at the couple's origin district level in Kerala to account for common shocks
to the wife's information set in her locality. We rst note a strong negative relationship
between the earnings ratio and the log of the migrant's annual income in Columns 1 and
2, which is in line with Prediction 1 of our model. The results also hold when residuals
16A response to asking him directly whether such disagreements exist within his own household would
likely be biased downwards since he may not be prepared to openly admit to having a conict with his
family.
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from the previous Mincer regression predicting log annual earnings are used instead (see
Table A.2 in the appendix).
Table 2: Determinants of the Reported Earnings Ratio
(1) (2)
Migrant's annual earnings (log) -0.290*** -0.330***
(0.06) (0.06)
Ratio of wife's to husband's remittance report 0.003
(0.04)
Median income of Gulf migrants (log) 0.176*
(0.10)
Wife's years of education 0.0184**
(0.01)
Wife is employed (indicator) 0.134*
(0.07)
Wife is unaware of husband's expenses (indicator) -0.093
(0.06)
Disagreement over remittance use (indicator) -0.111***
(0.04)
Migrant spends on temptation goods (indicator) -0.143***
(0.04)
Constant 1.891*
(1.07)
R-squared 0.14 0.35
Observations 108 108
*** statistically signicant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of the wife's report of the migrant's monthly
earnings to that of the migrant. Bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications) are
displayed in parenthesis, clustered at the district level.
Referring to Column 2, the positive coecient on the reported remittance gap is
small and statistically not dierent from zero (p = 0:95). We also performed a similar
exercise using the discrepancy in reported hours worked per week by the migrant, which
is unobserved by the wife but which the migrant has less reason to underreport. For the
subset of couples for which this data is available, wives underreported hours worked by 10
percent. We nd that the ratio of hours worked is uncorrelated with the reported earnings
gap (p-value = 0:73) when included as an additional variable in the empirical specication.
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Consequently, a possible predisposition by the wives to underreport unobserved variables
does not seem to play a role in explaining the reported earnings ratio.
The remaining variables in Column 2 behave as expected. Wives' years of education
and the presence of wives who are employed are positively correlated with the reported
income gap. More optimistic belief held by the wife about overseas income is also pos-
itively associated with the earnings ratio. In contrast, being unaware of the husband's
expenses in Qatar, having disagreement with the household over the uses of remittances
and spending on temptation goods by the migrant are negatively associated with the
reported income ratio. With the exception of the wife's unawareness of her husband's
expenses, all the predictors of the earnings gap are statistically signicant at the 10%
level or lower. Overall, the eects of asymmetric information on reporting behavior pre-
dicted by our model are supported by the empirical evidence that cannot be explained
by reporting biases.
We also separately examined the role of migrant networks on the wife's ability to
verify foreign earnings or to inuence her expectations of it. Access to a larger migrant
network could increase the availability and quality of information that recipients have
about migrant earnings abroad, potentially lowering the cost of verication (Chort et
al. (2012) and De Weerdt et al. (2014)). At the same time, larger networks could
be associated with greater negative selection of migrants with respect to education and
earnings as stronger networks help reduce the transaction costs associated with nding
jobs abroad (McKenzie and Rapoport (2007, 2010)). Using the KMS 2011 dataset, a
plot of the average years of education of migrants to the Gulf against the migration
prevalence rate at the taluk (sub-district) level reveals that localities with higher rates
of Gulf migration tend to have migrants with lower levels of education (see appendix
Figure A.3). Consequently, we would anticipate that spouses residing in areas with
larger migrant networks may expect lower overseas wages relative to localities with lower
incidences of Gulf migration.
Consistent with our prediction, when the migration prevalence rate is used instead of
the median migrant income as a regressor, we nd it to be negatively correlated with the
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reported earnings ratio and statistically signicant at conventional levels.17 Since migrant
networks indirectly captures expectations, we preferred the use of the median income term
in all subsequent analysis as a more direct measure of the potential information available
to wives of their husbands' foreign earnings.
V Remittance Behavior
In this section, we provide empirical analysis of the remittance behavior postulated in
Predictions 3 and 4.
Remittances and Underreporting
Our model predicts a positive association between the reported earnings ratio and re-
mittances. In the appendix, Figure A.4 is a scatterplot of annual remittances reported
by the migrant as a share of his annual income against the constructed earnings ratio.
Consistent with Prediction 3, which applies both to levels and shares of income, the tted
linear line shows that the lower the reported earnings ratio, the lower the income share
of remittances.
Interesting patterns emerge, when we plot together income shares of remittances con-
structed from the migrant's and his wife's reports against the earnings reported by the
migrant. In Figure 2, which is a plot of shares tted non-parametrically, we see that up to
a certain level of income, approximately US$ 6,700, both constructs of income shares of
remittances closely trail one another. However, after the mark of US$ 6,700, the income
shares of remittance start to diverge with wives increasingly reporting a higher share of
income remitted. These patterns are also consistent with the theoretical predictions of
our model. At lower income levels, where husbands make truthful reports about their
earnings, there should be little discrepancy in reports and, accordingly, income shares
of remittances. But at higher income levels, i.e., above the prescribed threshold, the
17Adding the district-level migration prevalence rate to the existing specication with the median
income of migrants (log) resulted in a multicollinearity issue. Both variables are negatively correlated
with a pairwise correlation of  0:67 (p = 0:00). The regression with the migration prevalence rate is
available upon request.
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model predicts the migrant's income share of remittances to decrease in his income but
the wife's reported share to increase.18 Finally, the patterns obtained are indicative of
the existence of a threshold for remittances and earning reports, which we later provide
further evidence of.19
Figure 2: Income Shares of Remittances Reported by Migrants and Wives
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In the ensuing empirical exercise we adopt a parsimonious remittance function with
the reported earnings ratio as a covariate. Let rk be the log amount of annual remittances,
sent by the migrant husband belonging to household k, and "k be a random mean-zero
error term. The impact of earnings ratio ! on remittance is obtained by estimating the
following specication:
rk = 0 + !k + 
0Yk + "k: (12)
The coecient of interest is  and a positive value would indicate that greater un-
18To see the latter relationship, if at all times the wife believes that her husband remits all his earnings
net of subsistence costs x, then her reported income share of remittances can be expressed as (bygross  
x)=bygross = 1  x=bygross, where bygross is the migrant's gross income reported, and we see that this share
is increasing in bygross.
19We can also observe a special type of dynamics at the bottom end of income distribution where
higher shares of income are remitted. Dierent factors could be responsible for this dynamics, e.g., in
case of an adverse income shock, migrants may borrow from others to remit.
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derreporting of the migrant's income by his spouse is associated with lower remittances.
The vector Yk is the collection of covariates expected to inuence remittance sent by the
migrant { (log) annualized income as reported by the migrant, an indicator variable if
another family member is working abroad, household income in India, the total amount
the household spent over the past 12 months on medical expenses expressed as a share
of the migrant's income and (log) median monthly income of overseas members reported
by households in Kerala.
In particular, having another family member working abroad is likely to reduce the
amount of remittance sent as the responsibility of supporting the household is distributed
between the members who are employed abroad. A higher share of income spent on
medical expenses over the year may reect an unexpected event that warranted additional
remittances. The median income of migrants from households in origin districts may
directly inuence remittance norms. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the
district level where the household back in Kerala resides.
Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of equation (12), where Column 1 is the basic
remittance regression that excludes the reported earnings ratio. Column 2 is the same
regression, now augmented with the reported earnings ratio that is statistically signicant
at the one percent level. The overall t of the regression substantially improves with
the addition of the earnings ratio. Remittances sent home are about 6 percent higher
when the reported earnings ratio is 10 percent larger. In Column 3, we also include
the predictors of the earnings ratio explored in Table 2 and nd that the correlates
of the reported earnings ratio are not statistically dierent from zero at conventional
levels, individually and collectively.20 This suggests that the earnings ratio can be used
as a summary statistic to reect the various channels through which the presence of
information asymmetry about foreign earnings aects remittances.
As a test of robustness, we provide additional results in appendix Table A.3, where
the migrant's report of remittances sent is replaced with the wife's report of remittance
received as the dependent variable (Columns 1 and 2) and the mean report of remittances
20An F-test of joint signicance yields a p-value of 0.47.
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Table 3: Correlates of Log Annual Remittances (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Reported earnings ratio - 0.655*** 0.591***
- (0.23) (0.22)
Migrant's annual earnings (log) 0.532*** 0.737*** 0.755***
(0.18) (0.20) (0.21)
Other family members working abroad -0.625*** -0.586*** -0.645***
(0.18) (0.12) (0.13)
Medical expenditure as income share 0.679* 0.664 0.665
(0.41) (0.46) (0.45)
Monthly income in India (log) 0.0501** 0.0343** 0.026
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Median income of Gulf migrants (log) 0.745**
(0.35)
Additional controls No No Yes
R-squared 0.31 0.40 0.41
Observations 108 108 108
*** statistically signicant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual remittances reported by the migrant. Addi-
tional controls consist of the wife's years of education and indicators for whether the wife is
employed, unaware of her husband's expenses, having disagreements over remittance uses,
and if the migrant spends on temptation goods. All regressions include a constant term.
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications) are displayed in parenthesis, clustered
at the district level.
sent and received (Columns 3 and 4). The reported earnings ratio in each case remains
statistically signicant at conventional levels.
The coecient of the reported earnings ratio from Column 3 of Table 3 shows that, all
else equal, a wife who understates her husband's overseas earnings by the average amount
in the sample receives 13 percent less in annual remittances compared to a wife with
perfect information about her husband's wages. Hypothetically, closing this information
gap about foreign earnings would be associated with an increase in annual remittances
of US$ 387 or nearly two months worth of monthly household expenses in India.
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Non-linearity of Remittances
Our theoretical model posits that remittances past the threshold are not responsive to
increased levels of the migrant's income (Prediction 4). We estimate the threshold at
US$ 6,740 using non-linear least squares method that ts a piecewise regression with the
full set of control variables for remittance and reporting behavior previously used.21 The
results of the piecewise regression are presented in Table 4. Appendix Figure A.5 shows
a non-parametric relationship between the migrant's income and remittances.
Table 4: Piece-Wise Regression for Annual Remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant's annual earnings 0.255*** 0.547*** 0.527*** 0.527***
(0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)
Migrant's earnings above threshold -0.455* -0.438** -0.425*
(0.25) (0.22) (0.22)
No. of other family members abroad -1,556*** -1,670***
(348) (350)
Medical expenditure as income share 3,506*** 3,374**
(1263) (1299)
Monthly income in India (log) 122.3** 81.87
(55.6) (72.4)
Median income of Gulf migrants (log) 1,994*** 2,112***
(651.7) (707.8)
Additional controls No No No Yes
R-square 0.15 0.19 0.41 0.44
Number of observations 108 108 108 108
*** statistically signicant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
Notes: Additional controls consist of the wife's years of education and indicators for whether
the wife is employed, unaware of her husband's expenses, having disagreements over remittance
uses and if the migrant spends on temptation goods. All regressions include a constant term.
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications) are displayed in parenthesis, clustered at
the district level. The threshold income of US$ 6,740 was determined by a non-linear least
square method using all variables in column (4).
From Column 4 in Table 4, we observe that, all else equal, i.e., for the \representa-
tive household", remittances increase on average by US$ 0.53 for every dollar increase
21The specication used for estimation is as follows: r = (0+1y)I(y  t)+(0+1t+2(y t))I(y >
t) + 0X, where r is remittances, y is the migrant's income, t is the threshold to be determined, and X
is a vector of controls for remittance and reporting behavior.
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in income below the threshold of US$ 6,740. However, past the threshold, transfers in-
crease only by US$ 0.11.22 Thus, consistent with the model's prediction, the slope of the
remittance function is smaller beyond the threshold. This pattern of remitting behavior
is similar to the threshold reporting behavior as discussed in relationship to Figure 2.23
Robustness
The remittance behavior observed in the data can hardly be explained under the assump-
tion of symmetric information unless strong assumptions are imposed on the recipient's
and the migrant's utility functions vR(:) and vM(:). In particular, in our model with
symmetric information, the slope of the remittance schedule is given by
r0(y) =
M(y   r(y))
R(r(y) + yR) + M(y   r(y)) ; (13)
where M and R are the migrant's and the recipient's coecients of absolute risk aver-
sion, respectively. We have to assume concave utility functions because with linearity the
remittance schedule is not well dened under symmetric information.24 The slope in (13)
is obtained by implicitly dierentiating the rst-order condition of the recipient's max-
imization problem maxr(y)
R y
y
vR(r(y) + yR)dF (y) subject to the migrant's participation
constraint.25
From our data, at levels of income below the threshold, the remittance slope is around
0:5 implying M  R from (13) or that the migrant's and the recipient's risk attitudes
are similar. Past the threshold, however, risk attitudes must dramatically change in
order to explain the data. Namely, for the remittance slope to take the value of 0:11
22A potential concern is that these results may not be robust due to the limited number of observations
beyond the threshold of US$ 6,740 (which is about 28% of all the observations). We also tested the
robustness of the change in slopes using the median level of annual income of US$5,918 as the threshold.
Annual remittances rose by US$0.57 for every dollar below the threshold and US$0.16 for each dollar of
income above it.
23Joseph et al. (2015) using matched administrative data on remittance and earnings data for a panel
of U.A.E. migrants nd that remittances are unresponsive to increases in income over time but fall with
negative income shocks, consistent with the empirical pattern we nd.
24As noted in footnote 9, concavity does not change the predictions of the model with asymmetric
information.
25See, e.g., Freixas and Rochet (2008, pp. 128-129) who obtain the same slope for the optimal
repayment schedule in the borrower-lender relationship.
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the coecient M must become signicantly smaller than R. Put dierently, past the
threshold the migrant's aversion to risk has to decrease at a much faster rate than that
of the recipient's in spite of the precarious conditions of temporary migration and an
equal, if not larger, share of income remitted up to and at the threshold. Arguably, a
more plausible scenario is when the migrant's and the recipient's risk attitudes do not
vary drastically with relatively modest changes of income. Then, if a half of overseas
income is initially remitted, the symmetric information model predicts a nearly constant
remittance slope throughout.
For similar reasons, the same conclusion applies to the remittance models of altruism
and investment as the optimal remittance schedule takes the same slope as in (13). This
is hardly surprising as similar marginal utility trade-os arise under dierent motives. In
the model of altruism, as presented in Rapoport and Docquier (2006, pp. 1143{1144),
the rst-order condition for the optimal remittance transfer r(y) is given by
 (1  )v0M(y   r(y)) + v0R(r(y) + yR) = 0; (14)
where  the coecient of altruism. Taking the internal derivative dr(y)=dy, dividing its
numerator and denominator by (1  )v0M(y   r(y)), and rearranging by using the rst-
order condition yield the slope as in (13). It can also be noted that the model of altruism
fails its canonical test of the negative eect of the household's income yR on remittances.
As Table 3 shows, the eect is close to zero, but never negative.
With regard to the systematic underreporting patterns observed here, existing models
of remittance can hardly explain them assuming no sudden shifts in the migrant's and
the recipient's risk attitudes. Suppose it is the case that wives infer their husbands'
income from the remittances received. Then, the prediction of a constant remittance
slope obtained under our assumption implies that the accuracy of wives' inference should
not vary with their husbands' income. But the observed discrepancy suggests the opposite
{ inference becomes less accurate at higher levels of income. These observations, coupled
with our empirical ndings, suggest that the model extended with asymmetric information
can better explain the observed remittance behavior, calling for further theoretical and
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empirical research in this area.26
VI Conclusion
This paper contributes to the emerging body of literature that studies the eects of in-
formational asymmetries on intra-household transfers. Our results strongly support the
view that asymmetric information is an important determinant of remittance behavior.
Specically, our contribution is three-fold. First, we provide direct empirical evidence of
informational asymmetries by collecting and contrasting household members' reports of
foreign earnings that are observable by only one party. Second, we show that the dis-
crepancy in foreign earning reports between migrants and remittance recipients is highly
correlated with remittance behavior. Third, we oer a new approach towards model-
ing the exchange motive for remittances with asymmetric information about overseas
earnings that is consistent with our empirical results.
Our survey of Indian households with husbands working in Qatar reveals signicant
informational asymmetries within transnational households. Empirical analysis demon-
strates the presence of a number of patterns in reporting and remittance behavior that
cannot be explained by individual biases. A striking feature of these patterns is the
dierence in the behavior of low- and high-income migrants, where the latter tend to un-
derreport their earnings more and, accordingly, remit less as a share of their income. To
explain the observed patterns in migrants' behavior, which is inconsistent with existing
remittance models, we adapt the classical model of costly state verication to the problem
of remittance contracting under an exchange motive. The theoretical results produced by
the model closely match our empirical ndings. The optimal remittance contract, oered
by the recipient who can observe the migrant's earnings only at some cost, prescribes a
threshold for remittances such that if not met, verication is initiated. Under the threat
of sanctions, the migrant is truthful but only up to the threshold, which is sucient to
explain our empirical ndings. Finally, our empirical analysis together with theoretical
26Relatedly, Kinnan (2014) nds asymmetric information an important factor for insurance provision
in Thai villages by showing that it is the predictions of the insurance model with hidden income that
receive the most empirical support.
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insights suggests that the reported earnings ratio is a useful summary statistic of direct
and indirect eects of informational asymmetries on remittance ows calling for further
research.
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Appendix. Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Reported Earnings Ratio Against Migrant's Annual Income
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The regression line ( solid red ) is shown with its 95 % confidence band ( green dashed lines ) .
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Figure A.2: Reported Earnings Gap Against Migrant's Annual Income
−
10
00
0
−
50
00
0
50
00
R
ep
or
te
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 g
ap
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
Migrant’s annual earnings report
reported earnings gap 95% CI
Fitted values
The regression line ( solid red ) is shown with its 95 % confidence band ( green dashed lines ) .
Figure A.3: Migrant's Average Education Attainment Against Migration Prevalence Rate
(subdistrict-level)
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The regression line ( solid red ) is shown with its 95 % confidence band ( green dashed lines ) .
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Figure A.4: Income Share of Remittances Against Reported Earnings Ratio
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The regression line ( solid red ) is shown with its 95 % confidence band ( green dashed lines ) .
Figure A.5: Annual Remittances (US$) Against Migrant's Annual Income (US$)
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The non−parametric regression line (solid red) is shown with its 95% confidence band (green dashed lines).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table A.1: Comparision of QSKF and KMS
QSKF KMS
Migrant's age (years) 38.56 39.81
(7.62) (8.33)
Years worked abroad 9.98 10.95
(8.53) (8.40)
Migrant's annual earnings (US$) 4807.33 4639.75
(1799.63) (3047.94)
Annual remittance received (US$) 2377.77 1845.03
(1827.44) (1985.06)
Number of observation 108 1778
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Determinants of the Reported Earnings Ratio
(1) (2)
Log earnings residual -0.351*** -0.354***
(0.06) (0.06)
Ratio of wife's to husband's remittance report -0.002
(0.04)
Median income of Gulf migrants (log) 0.144
(0.09)
Wife's years of education 0.0149*
(0.01)
Wife is employed (indicator) 0.134*
(0.07)
Wife is unaware of husband's expenses (indicator) -0.085
(0.06)
Disagreement over remittance use (indicator) -0.116***
(0.04)
Migrant spends on temptation goods (indicator) -0.133***
(0.04)
Constant 0.788*** -0.632
(0.02) (0.91)
R-squared 0.18 0.37
Observations 108 108
*** statistically signicant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of the wife's report of the migrant's
earnings to that of the migrant. Bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications)
are displayed in parenthesis, clustered at the district level.
38
Table A.3: Determinants of Log Annual Remittances (OLS)
Wife's Report Mean Report
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reported earnings ratio 0.761*** 0.631* 0.714*** 0.626***
(0.25) (0.34) (0.20) (0.21)
Migrant's annual earnings (log) 0.892*** 0.819*** 0.819*** 0.811***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18)
Other family members working abroad -0.14 -0.12 -0.417*** -0.459***
(0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16)
Medical expenditure as income share -0.109 -0.172 0.379 0.365
(0.61) (0.61) (0.45) (0.45)
Monthly income in India (log) -0.002 -0.053 0.022 -0.002
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
Median income of Gulf migrants (log) 0.551* 0.453 0.671*** 0.693***
(0.31) (0.36) (0.21) (0.25)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.19 0.25 0.38 0.41
Observations 108 108 108 108
*** statistically signicant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual remittances as reported by the wife (columns 1 & 2)
and the average of husband's and wife's reports (columns 3 & 4). Additional controls consist of the
wife's years of education and indicators for whether the wife is employed, unaware of her husband's
expenses, having disagreements over remittance uses and if the migrant spends on temptation goods.
All regressions include a constant term. Bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications) are
displayed in parenthesis, clustered at the district level.
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